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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the connection model. In
sharp contrast to the homogeneous cases we show that under heterogeneity involving only two
degrees of freedom, all networks can be supported as Nash or eﬃcient. Moreover, we show that
there does not always exist Nash networks. However, we show that on reducing heterogeneity,
both the earlier “anything goes” result and the non existence problem disappear.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85.
Key Words: Strategic reliability, decay, two-way ﬂow models
1 Introduction
Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006, [3]) consider the case of small levels of decay with
heterogeneous players. Their insider-outsider model only has two groups of players, and thus
two possible values of c. The notion of Nash networks was introduced by Bala and Goyal
1(2000, [1]).1 In their paper (2000, [1]), they study two frameworks. In the ﬁrst one, links in
the network never fail, and always transmit all information reliably. Given that link formation
is costly, the authors ﬁnd that Nash networks are always minimally connected. In the second
one, Bala and Goyal introduce link imperfections in the form of information decay whereby
direct links convey more information than indirect links.
In a recent paper in Games and Economic Behavior, Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
(2006, [3]) examine heterogeneity in Nash networks without taking any link imperfections into
account. Their results are similar in spirit to those of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) in the sense
that equilibrium networks now have components that are minimally connected. Heterogeneity
in the presence of link imperfections has been analyzed by Haller and Sarangi (2005, [4]) who
ﬁnd that the homogeneity of the parameters plays a signiﬁcant role in the two widely divergent
results of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1], [2]). Haller and Sarangi (2005, [4]) allow diﬀerent links
to have diﬀerent success probabilities and ﬁnd that for any network g, there exists a set of
parameter values under which g is Nash – the model with heterogeneity can encompass the
results of both Bala and Goyal papers.
In this paper we examine diﬀerent possible heterogeneous Nash network formulations using
the popular “connections model” introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, [5]) and studied
extensively by Bala and Goyal (2000, [1], [2]). In the typical model players are endowed
with some information which can be accessed by other players forming links with them. Link
formation is costly and the cost of establishing a link is incurred by the initiating player.
In these models heterogeneity manifests itself in the payoﬀ function and can occur through
three diﬀerent variables: (i) the value of information held by players, (ii) the rate at which
information decays or loses value as it traverses the network, and (iii) the cost of forming a
link. Thus by introducing heterogeneity and decay we are able to generalize the results of Bala
and Goyal (2000, [1]) where heterogeneity is not taken into consideration.
We focus on the two-way ﬂow models introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). The
two-way ﬂow model allows bi-directional ﬂow of information through a link regardless of who
1In the following, we use Nash networks to refer to networks that satisfy Nash equilibrium as stability concept
instead of Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996, [5]) notion of pairwise stability.
2establishes it. Here we examine Nash networks, eﬃcient networks and the existence of strict
Nash networks under diﬀerent possible heterogeneous frameworks arising from combinations
of the above variables. Our main results can be summarized as follows: in models with decay
and heterogeneity it is possible to support any network as a strict Nash or eﬃcient network.
Moreover, the existence of Nash networks can fail in situations where we have decay and
heterogeneity together.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model setup. Section 3 contains
results about models that incorporate heterogeneity and decay. In Section 4 we discuss the
relationship between the probabilistic models and the decay models.
2 Model Setup
In this section we deﬁne the formal elements of the strategic form network formation game.
Let N = {1,...,n}, n ≥ 3, denote the set of with generic elements i,j,k. For ordered pairs
(i,j) ∈ N × N, the shorthand notation i j is used and for non-ordered pairs {i,j} ⊂ N the
shorthand [i j] is used.
Strategies. For player i a pure strategy is a vector gi = (gi,1,...,gi,i−1,gi,i+1, ...,gi,n)
∈ {0,1}n−1. Since our aim is to model network formation, gi,j = 1 implies that there exists
a direct link between i and j initiated by player i, whereas gi,j = 0 means that i does not
initiate this link. Regardless of what player i does, player j can always choose to initiate
a link with i or set gj,i = 0. Here we focus only on pure strategies. The set of all pure
strategies of player i is denoted by Gi and consists of 2n−1 elements. The joint strategy space
is given by G = G1 ×     × Gn. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between G
and the set of all directed graphs or networks with vertex set N. Namely, to a strategy
proﬁle g = (g1,...,gn) ∈ G corresponds the graph (N,E(g)) with edge set E(g) = {(i,j) ∈
N ×N| i  = j, gi,j = 1 and gi,i = 0}. To simplify the notation, we denote by i j the link formed
by player i with j. In the sequel, we identify a joint strategy g by its corresponding graph and
use the terminology directed graph or directed network g for it.
Payoﬀs. Payoﬀs of player i are given by the diﬀerence between beneﬁts Bi(g) and costs ci(g).
3Hence the payoﬀ of player i in network g is given by
ui(g) = Bi(g) − ci(g). (1)
Next we deﬁne various types of heterogeneity in networks by introducing diﬀerent cost and
beneﬁt formulations.
(i) Link Costs. Players incur costs only for the direct links they establish. The cost of each





In this paper we focus only on homogeneous costs. Note that in our context heterogeneous
costs would only increase the set of potential strict Nash networks and would weaken the
possibility of existence of Nash networks.
(ii) Link Beneﬁts. Decay models were introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, [5]) under
the name of the “connections model”. In such models links always transmit the information,
but information acquired through indirect links is less valuable. Since information loses value
as it travels along a sequence of links it captures the idea that “it is better to have the facts
straight from the horse’s mouth”. In the Nash networks setting decay models were analyzed
by Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) who assumed that the value of information, the costs of link
formation, and the decay parameter were identical across all players and links. In other words,
they analyzed the case of homogeneous decay. We propose two diﬀerent frameworks to study
the interaction between heterogeneity and decay.
A link between players i and j allows for two-way ﬂow of information. So the beneﬁts
from network g are derived from its closure g ∈ G, deﬁned by gi,j = max {gi,j,gj,i} for i  = j.
Moreover, since information is acquired through direct and indirect links we say information
ﬂows from player j to player i, when i and j are linked by means of a path in g. A path of
length m in g ∈ G from player i to player j  = i, is a ﬁnite sequence i0,i1,...,im of pairwise
distinct players such that i0 = i, im = j, and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k = 0,...,m − 1. Let Ci,j(g) be
the set of paths from j to i in the network g, and let Ci,j(g) be a typical element of Ci,j(g). We
denote by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N| j  = i, there exists a path in g between i and j}, the set of other
4players whom i can access or “observe” in network g. Information received from j is worth
Vi,j to player i. Therefore, player i’s beneﬁts from a network g is given by:
Note that g belongs to the set H = {h ∈ G|hi,j = hj,i for i  = j}. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between the elements of H and the non-directed networks with node set N.
Namely, for h ∈ H and i  = j, [i j] is an edge of the corresponding non-directed network if
and only if hi,j = hj,i = 1. In what follows, we identify h with the corresponding non-directed
network. Hence, the notation [i j] ∈ h stands for “[i j] is an edge of h”. Also, for k ∈ H,
k ⊂ h means that k is a subnetwork of h.
Decay with Heterogeneous Players. Here we use the homogeneous decay assumption
in conjunction with the heterogeneous players framework of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
(2006, [3]), i.e., we assume that there exists (i,j)  = (k,ℓ) such that Vi,j  = Vk,ℓ. Then the





where δ is the decay parameter and di,j(g) is the distance in the shortest path between i and
j in g.2 Let V m = max(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j} and V m = min(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j}.
Decay with Heterogeneous Links. Here we assume that decay associated with the link
[i j] is not identical to decay associated with the link [ℓ k] for [ℓ k]  = [i j]. This assumption
captures the fact that the quantity of information a link can convey is not the same across all
links under decay. In other words, some channels of information or paths are “better” than
others.
We measure decay associated with a link [i j] by the parameter δi,j ∈ (0,1). Given a
network g, it is assumed that if player i has a link with player j, then she receives information
of value δi,j from j. For this model we retain the symmetry assumption, that is δi,j = δj,i.
Without loss of generality we assume that the value of a link is V = 1. The beneﬁts of player



















Note that this expression fundamentally diﬀers from the previous one because it does not
use the geodesic distance between players to determine the value of information obtained. Let
δM = max(i,j)∈N×N{δi,j} and δm = min(i,j)∈N×N{δi,j}.
Network Deﬁnitions. Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network that remains
when all of player i’s links have been removed. Clearly, g = gi ⊕ g−i, where the symbol ⊕
indicates that g is composed of the union of links in gi and g−i (similarly the symbol ⊖ is
used to indicate removal of links). A strategy gi is a best response of player i to g−i if
ui(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ ui(g′
i ⊕ g−i), for all g′
i ∈ Gi.
Let BRi(g−i) denote the set of player i’s best responses to g−i. A network g = (g1,...,gn)
is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each i ∈ N. A strict Nash network is a
network where all players are playing a strict best response.




i=1 ui(g′), for all g′ ∈ G.
Graph-theoretic Concepts. A network g is called a star if there is a vertex is, such that
for all j  = is, max{gis,j,gj,is} = 1 and for all k  ∈ {is,j}, max{gk,j,gj,k} = 0. Moreover a
star, where gis,j = 1 for all j  = is is a center-sponsored star, and a star, where gis,j = 0 for
all j  = is, is a periphery-sponsored star. A network g is connected if there is a path in g
between all players i,j ∈ N. A network g is minimally connected if it is connected and for all
i j ∈ E(g), g ⊖ i j is not connected. Finally, a network g ∈ G is essential if gi,j = 1 implies
gj,i = 0. Note that if g ∈ G is a Nash network, then it must be essential. This follows from
the fact that each link is costly, but allows for two-way ﬂow of information regardless of who
initiates (and pays) for the link.
3 Models with Decay
In this section we investigate Nash networks and examine eﬃcient networks in models with
decay. To begin with, we illustrate that parameter through which heterogeneity is introduced
6in the model of decay can have diﬀerent implications. The next example shows that there are
subtle diﬀerences between the model of heterogeneous players and heterogeneous links.
Example here
3.1 Decay with Heterogeneous Players
In this section we obtain two main results. First, we demonstrate that all networks can be
supported as strict Nash and eﬃcient. Next, we show that there exist parameter values for
which there is no Nash network in pure strategies.
Theorem 1 Let g be an essential network. If the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3), then
there exist a link cost c > 0 and an array V = [Vi,j] of values such that:
1. g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game;
2. g is an eﬃcient network in the corresponding network formation game. Moreover this
network is also strict Nash.
Proof. We prove successively the two parts of the proposition.
1. Suppose g is an essential network. Let V 1 = 1, c = (n−3/2)/n2, δ = 1/n, V 0 = 1/(3n).
We construct a symmetric n × n-matrix [Vi,j] of value as follows. If i  = j and i and
j are linked, i.e. gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 set Vi,j = V 1. Otherwise set Vi,j = V 0. Now
consider i  = j. Let gi,j = 0. Then, either gj,i = 1 or gj,i = 0. In the ﬁrst case, agent
i receives zero marginal beneﬁts but incurs an additional positive cost when forming
the link i j. It follows that gi,j = 0 is the unique optimal choice for i given g−i. For
gj,i = 0, Vi,j = V 0 = 1/(3n). If player i forms a link with j, then she obtains at most
marginal beneﬁts equal to δV 0+(n−2)δ2V 1, that is 1/(3n2)+(n−2)/n2. We show that
δV 0 < c−(n−2)δ2V 1. We have δV 0 = 1/(3n2) < 1/(2n2) = (n−3/2)/n2−(n−2)/n2 =
c− (n− 2)δ2V 1. Therefore regardless of other links, not initiating the link i j is optimal
for agent i. Now let gi,j = 1. Then by essentiality of g, gj,i = 0. Further, Vi,j = V 1.
If player i removes the link i j, then she obtains at most a payoﬀ equal to δ2Vi,j from
player j. It follows that due to the link i j player i obtains marginal beneﬁts equal to at
7least V 1(δ − δ2) = 1/n − 1/n2 = (n − 1)/n2 > (n − (3/2))/n2 = c. Therefore regardless
of other links, player i has no incentive to remove the link i j.
2. Suppose g is an essential network. Let V 1 = 1, c = (n4 + n2 + 1)/(2n8), δ = 1/n4,
V 0 = 1/n4. We construct a symmetric n×n-matrix [Vi,j] of value as follows. If i  = j and
i and j are linked, i.e. gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 set Vi,j = V 1. Otherwise set Vi,j = V 0. Now
consider i  = j. Suppose gi,j = 0 and gj,i = 0 (if gj,i = 1, then the proof is straightforward).
If player i forms a link with j, then the players obtain total marginal beneﬁts bounded
by 2δ(V 0) + δ2n2V 1 = 2/(n8) + 1/n6 = (2 + n2)/n8 < (n4 + n2 + 1)/(2n8) = c, for all
n ≥ 3. Therefore regardless of other links, not initiating the link i j is optimal. Further,
Vi,j = V 1. If player i removes the link i j, then she obtains at most a payoﬀ equal to
δ2Vi,j from player j. Due to the link i j, player i obtains marginal beneﬁts equal to at
least V 1(δ − δ2) = 1/n4 − 1/n8 = (n4 − 1)/n8 > (n4 + n2 + 1)/(2n8) = c, for all n ≥ 3.
Since all values are positive, other players obtain a non negative payoﬀ from this link.
Therefore regardless of other links, maintaining the link i j is optimal for agents.
￿
With homogenous players, Nash networks are either empty or connected (see Bala and
Goyal, 2000, [1]). With heterogenous values of players it is possible to obtain this result when
the values of players are suﬃciently close.
Proposition 1 Suppose beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3) and that V M−V m < δV m/(1+
(n − 3)δ). Then a strict Nash network is either empty or connected.
Proof. Let D∗(g,i j) be the set of players ℓ ∈ N \{i,j} such that the shortest chain between
i and ℓ goes through the link i j in g. Consider a strict Nash network g. Suppose g is neither
empty nor connected. Then there exists three agents i, j and k such that i and j belong to
one connected component C1 and k belongs to a diﬀerent component C2 in g. Moreover, wlog
8let gi,j = 1. Then the incremental beneﬁts to player i of having the direct link to j is given by:









≤ δV M +
 
ℓ∈D∗(g,i j) δdi,ℓ(g)V M
with the convention δdi,ℓ(g⊖i j) = 0, if ℓ  ∈ Ni(g ⊖ i j). Clearly, we have A ≥ c.
If player k forms a link with player j, then the incremental beneﬁts to player i of having
the direct link to j is:
B = δVk,j + δ2Vk,i +
 
ℓ∈D∗(g,i j) δdi,ℓ(g)Vk,ℓ
≥ δV m + δ2V m +
 
ℓ∈D∗(g,i j) δdi,ℓ(g)V m.






δdi,ℓ(g)V m ≤ (n − 3)δ2(V M − V m).
Since V M − V m < δV m/(1 + (n − 3)δ), we have B > A ≥ c. It follows that player k has a
incentive to form a link with j and g is not strict Nash. ￿
From the above proposition it follows that in the homogeneous parameter model with decay
not every network can be supported as a strict Nash network.
Polar cases. We now deal with some familiar architectures cases. More precisely, we
give conditions which allow to obtain the complete network the empty network and the star
networks as strict Nash networks.
Proposition 2 Suppose beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3).
1. If δV M < c, then the empty network is strict Nash
2. If (δ − δ2)V m > c, then the complete network is strict Nash.
3. If δV m > c and (δ−δ2)V M < c, then any center-sponsored star is a strict Nash network.
Moreover, if (n − 1)δV m > c and (δ − δ2)V M < c, then any periphery-sponsored star is
a strict Nash network.
9Proof. We prove successively the three parts of the proposition.
1. If δV M < c, then it will not be worthwhile for any agent i to form a link. Hence the
empty network is Nash.
2. If (δ − δ2)V m > c, then each player i has an incentive to form a link with player j if she
does not obtain the resources of j thanks to a direct link. Hence the complete network
is Nash.
3. If δV m > c and (δ − δ2)V M < c, then player i has no incentive to delete any link in the
center sponsored star where she is the center. Moreover, no player j  = i has an incentive
to form a link in the center sponsored star where i is the center since (δ − δ2)V M < c.
the result follows. Finally, if (n − 1)δV m > c and (δ − δ2)V M < c, then no player j  = i
has an incentive to delete any link in the periphery sponsored star where player i ∈ N is
the center. Moreover, no player j  = i has an incentive to form a link with j′ ∈ N \ {i,j}
in the periphery sponsored star where i is the center since (δ − δ2)V M < c. the result
follows.
￿
Existence of Nash networks. In this context we begin by showing that if heterogeneity is
not “too high”, more precisely if Vi,j = Vi for all i ∈ N, then a Nash network always exists. It
follows that there always exist a Nash network in the model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]).
Proposition 3 If the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3) and, for all i ∈ N, Vi,j = Vi, for
all j ∈ N \ {i}, then a Nash network always exists.
Proof. Let Z0 = {j ∈ N | δVj ≥ c} be the set of players who has an incentive to form a
link with any player j with whom they are not (indirectely) linked; and let z be the maximal
value player, that is the player such that Vz ≥ Vi for all i ∈ N. Moreover, let Z1 = {j ∈ N |
(δ − δ2)Vj ≥ c} be the set of players who has an incentive to form a link with any player j
with whom they are not directely linked. Clearly if Z1  = ∅, then z ∈ Z1. Further if Z1 = ∅,
then no player i will form a link with a player j in g whenever di,j(g) ≤ 2. If Z0 = ∅, then the
empty network is a Nash network. If Z0  = ∅ and Z1 = ∅, then we let player z form links with
10all other players. We obtain a center-sponsored star which is a Nash network. Indeed, the
distance between all players i and j is bounded by 2 and Z1 = ∅, no player has an incentive to
form a link. If Z0  = ∅ and Z1  = ∅, then we create network g where player z forms links with all
other players and where gj,i = 0 implies gi,j = 1 for all i ∈ Z1 and for all j ∈ N \{z}. Clearly,
g is Nash since player z ∈ Z1 has no incentive to delete one of her links, each player i ∈ Z1
has no incentive to delete any link by construction and no player i′  ∈ Z1 has any incentive to
form an additional link (otherwise she would belong to Z1). ￿
Corollary 1 If the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3) and, for all i ∈ N, Vi,j = V , for all
j ∈ N \ {i}, then a Nash network always exists.
The following example shows that non-existence can occur when we introduce higher player
heterogeneity.




δ − δ4 
+V1,3(δ2−δ3) > c, δV1,3 < δV1,2 < c, and for all j  = 2, δV1,j+δ2  




δ − δ4 
+ V2,4(δ2 − δ3) < c, δV2,3 + δ2V2,4 + δ3V2,5 + δ4V2,1 > c, and for all j  = 3,
δV2,j + δ2  
k =j V2,k < c.
3. δV3,4 > c and δ
 
k =4 V3,k + δ2V3,4 < c.
4. δV4,5 > c and δ
 
k =5 V4,k + δ2V4,5 < c.
5. δV5,1 > c and δ
 
k =1 V5,k + δ2V5,1 < c.
These ﬁve points provide a list of the players with whom the others have no incentives to form
links, as well as those with whom they would like to form links. For example, item 1 implies
that player 1 will never form a link with players 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, a Nash network must
contain the links 3 4, 4 5, 5 1. From all of this, it follows that there is four possible Nash
networks: E(g1) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,1 2,2 3), E(g2) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,1 2), E(g3) = (3 4,4 5,5 1),
E(g4) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,2 3). We know from item 2 that player 2 prefers the network g2 to the
network g1, so g1 is not Nash. Likewise, player 1 prefers the network g3 to the network g2 by
11point 1, so g2 is not Nash. Player 2 prefers the network g4 to the network g3 by point 2, so
g3 is not Nash. Finally, by point 1, player 1 prefers the network g1 to the network g4. Hence
g4 is not Nash.
3.2 Decay with Heterogeneous Links
In this section we consider situations where players have homogeneous values while the decay
through each link is diﬀerent. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Let g be an essential network. If the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (4)
and costs of forming links are homogeneous, then there exist c > 0 and an array δ = [δi,j] of
decay such that:
1. g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game;
2. g is an eﬃcient network in the corresponding network formation game. Moreover this
network is also strict Nash.
Proof. We prove succesively the two parts of the proof.
1. The proof of the ﬁrst part of this proposition is an adaptation of the proof given by Haller
and Sarangi (pg.186, 2005, [4]). Suppose g is an essential network. Let δ1 = 1/(4n),
c = δ1/3, δ0 = c/n. We construct a symmetric n × n-matrix [δi,j] of decay as follows. If
i  = j and i and j are linked, i.e. gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 set δi,j = δ1. Otherwise set δi,j = δ0.
Now consider i  = j. If gi,j = 0, then either gj,i = 1 or gj,i = 0. In the ﬁrst case, agent i
would receive zero beneﬁts but incurs a positive cost when forming the link i j. It follows
that gi,j = 0 is the unique optimal choice for i given g−i. In case gj,i = 0, δi,j = δ0 = c/n.
It follows that c > nδ0 > (n − 1)δ0, where (n − 1)δ0 is the maximal i’s beneﬁts from the
direct link i j that player i can obtain. Therefore regardless of other links, not iniating
the link i j is optimal for agent i. If gi,j = 1, then by essentiality of g, gi,j = 0. Further,
δi,j = δ1. Without the link i j, the information ﬂows between i and j via other links is
at most
 
δ1 2 = δ1/(4n) < δ1/2. Hence regardless of other links in g, the beneﬁts of
player i from initiating the link with player j is at least δ1 − δ1/2 = δ1/2 which exceeds
c = δ1/3. Therefore regardless of other links, iniating the link i j is optimal for agent i.
122. Suppose g is an essential network. Let δ1 = 1/(4n), c = δ1/3, δ0 = c/(n + 1)2. We
construct a symmetric n × n-matrix [δi,j] of decay as follows. If i  = j and i and j are
linked, i.e. gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 set δi,j = δ1. Otherwise set δi,j = δ0. Now consider
i  = j. If gi,j = 0, then either gj,i = 1 or gj,i = 0. In the ﬁrst case, agents would receive
zero beneﬁts but agent i incurs a positive cost when forming the link i j. It follows that
gi,j = 0 is the unique optimal choice for i given g−i. In case gj,i = 0, δi,j = δ0 = c/(n+1)2.
It follows that c > n2δ0 > n(n−1)δ0, where n(n−1)δ0 is an upper bound for the beneﬁts
from the direct link i j that players can obtain. Therefore regardless of other links, not
iniating the link i j is optimal. If gi,j = 1, then we know that agent i has no incentive
to delete this link. Since the decay factor is positive, players j ∈ N \ {i} obtain a non
negative beneﬁts from this link. It follows that this link must be preserved in an eﬃcient
network. The result follows.
￿
Next, if we assume that decay begins only with indirect neighbors (instead of direct neighbors),
then we can show that regardless of the value of the parameters, some essential networks are
neither Nash nor eﬃcient.
Example 2 Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players, let g be a network such that E(g) = {1 2}.
Then, g is not a Nash network. Indeed, if player 1 has an incentive to form a link with player
2, then V < c. In that case, player 3 has an incentive to form a link with player 1. Likewise g
is not an eﬃcient network.
We are now interested in situations which allow to obtain the same kind of results than those
established in the homogeneous decay framework. Hence, we give a threshold concerning
the heterogeneity of decays which allows to obtain that Nash networks are either empty or
connected.
Proposition 5 Suppose the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (4) and (δM −δm) < δm/(1+
(n − 3)δM). Then a Nash network is either empty or connected.






i,ℓ(g⊖i j) δℓ′,ℓ′′. Consider a Nash network g. Suppose g is neither empty nor connected.
13Then there exist three agents i, j and k such that i and j belong to one connected component
C1 and k belongs to a diﬀerent component C2 in g. Moreover, we suppose wlog that gi,j = 1.








j,ℓ(g) δℓ′ ℓ′′ −
 
[ℓ′ ℓ′′]∈C∗















i,ℓ(g⊖i j) δℓ′ ℓ′′ = 0, if ℓ  ∈ Ni(g ⊖ i j). Clearly, we have A′ ≥ c.
If player k forms a link with player j, then the incremental beneﬁts to player i of having



















A′ − B′ ≤ (n − 3)δM(δM − δm).
Since (δM − δm) < δm/(1 + (n − 3)δM), we have B′ > A′ ≥ c. It follows that player k has a
incentive to form a link with j and g is not strict Nash. ￿
Polar cases. We now deal with some familiar architectures cases. More precisely, we give con-
ditions which allow to obtain the complete network the empty network and the star networks
as strict Nash networks.
Proposition 6 Suppose beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (3).
1. If δM < c, then the empty network is strict Nash
2. If (δm − (δm)2) > c, then the complete network is strict Nash.
143. If δm < c and (δM −(δM)2) < c, then any center sponsored star is a strict Nash network.
Moreover, if (n − 1)δm < c and (δM − (δM)2) < c, then any periphery sponsored star is
a strict Nash network.
Proof. The two ﬁrst parts of the proposition are straightforward. We now deal with the
third part. Suppose δm < c for all j ∈ N and (δM − (δM)2) < c. Since δm < c, then player i
has an incentive to maintain all her links in the center sponsored star where she is the center,
and since (δM − (δM)2) < c, no player j  = i0 has an incentive to add a link in this network.
Suppose δm < c and (δM − (δM)2) < c. Since δm < c, no player j  = i has an incentive to
remove her link in a periphery sponsored star where i is the center and since (δM −(δM)2) < c
no player has an incentive to add a link in such a network. ￿
Existence of Nash networks. As in the model with heterogeneous players, we begin by
showing that if heterogeneity is not “too high”, more precisely if δi,j = δi for all i ∈ N, then
a Nash network always exists.
Proposition 7 Suppose the beneﬁts function satisﬁes equation (4) and, for all i ∈ N, δi,j = δi,
for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then a Nash network always exists.
Proof. The proof is very similar as the proof of Proposition 3, hence we only give the sets
which allow to construct the proof. Let Z′
0 = {j ∈ N | δj ≥ c} be the set of players who has an
incentive to form a link with any player j with whom they are not (indirectely) linked; and let
z′ be the “minimal decay player”, that is the player such that δz′ ≥ δi for all i ∈ N. Moreover,
let Z′
1 = {j ∈ N | (δj −δ2
j) ≥ c} be the set of players who has an incentive to form a link with
any player j with whom they are not directely linked. ￿
The following example shows that non-existence can occur when we introduce decay het-
erogeneity.
Example 3 Let N = 1,2,21,3,31,..,36,4,41 be the set of players. We assume that c = 1.95,
δ1,2 = δ2,1 = 0.6, δ1,4 = δ4,1 = 0.5, δ4,3 = δ3,4 = 0.28, δ2,3 = δ3,2 = 0.256, δ2,21 = δ21,2 = 1,
δ4,41 = δ41,4 = 1, δ3,k = δk,3 = 1, for all k ∈ {31,...,36}, and δi,j = 0 for all remaining
i j. Obviously, none of the links with δi,j = 0 will be established. Clearly player 3 does not
15form the link 3 2. Moreover player 4 will never establish the link 4 1, and player 2 will never
establish the link 2 1. Further, player 1 does not establish simultaneously the two links 1 4
and 1 4. It follows that the link [1 4] will always be formed. We obtain:
• if player 1 forms the link 1 4, then player 2 forms the link 2 3;
• if player 1 does not forms the link 1 4, then player 2 does not form the link 2 3;
• if player 2 forms the link 2 3, then player 1 forms the link 1 2 and does not form 1 4;
• if player 2 does not form the link 2 3, then player 1 forms the link 1 4 and does not form
1 2.
4 Discussion
It is noteworthy that we ﬁnd in our paper some results which are qualitatively similar to the
results ﬁnd in the probabilistic models with heterogeneity. In particular Haller and Sarangi
(2005, [4]) ﬁnd that there exist parameters such that all networks are strict Nash and the
possibility of non existence of Nash networks. It follows that it is useful to compare the
probabilistic and the decay models. Speciﬁcally, we focus on two questions: Can strict Nash
networks in one class of models tell us anything about strict Nash networks in the other class
of models?
In the probabilistic model each link has a probability p to work. Hence, the probabilistic model
uses all the paths between two players for computing payoﬀs while the decay model only uses
the shortest path between two players to determine payoﬀs. At ﬁrst glance this suggests that
decay models might be a subset of the probabilistic models. Hence we ask if information about
strict Nash networks in probabilistic models give some sense about strict Nash networks in
decay models. To address this question, we compare marginal payoﬀs of links in both types
of models.3 In order to make the models comparable we assume that starting from the empty
network, the marginal payoﬀs of a link is the same in both models, that is we set δ = p.
3Note that in the probabilistic model players’ marginal payoﬀs are expected marginal payoﬀs. However, for both
types of models, we use the term marginal payoﬀs to make reading easier. Moreover, we assume that players in the
probabilistic model are risk neutral.
16We ﬁrst show that when the initial network is minimal, the marginal payoﬀ of a link is always
at least as great in the probabilistic model as in the decay model.
Indeed, suppose that in a minimal network g1, one player, say player i, forms a link with say
player j. Let the resulting network be denoted by g2. Either j is not observed by player i in
g1 and it is obvious that the marginal payoﬀ of the link i j is the same in both models, or j is
observed by i in g1. In the latter case, in the decay model, player i being at distance 1 from
player j in g2, she obtains an amount p of resources of player j. In the probabilistic model, i
accesses to the resources of j in g2 if the link i j works, that occurs with a probability p. She
also accesses the resources of j even when the link i j does not work. It is enough that all the
links which were contained in a path from j to i in g1 work. So, the amount of resources of
player j obtained by player i in g2 is greater than p. With the same type of reasoning, we can
show that the part of the resources of players k  = j, obtained by i in g2, is at least as great
in the probabilistic model as in the decay model. The result follows. From this result, it is
straightforward that a minimally connected Nash network in the probabilistic model is also a
Nash network in the decay model.
Next what happens if the initial network is not minimal? The example which follows shows
that the above result does not hold anymore.
Example 4 Let N = {1,2,3,4} be the set of players and let g1 be a network such that
E{g1} = (1 2,2 3,3 4,4 1).
Suppose that in g1 player 1 forms a link with player 3. We can check that for some p, for
instance p = 0.8, the marginal payoﬀ of this link is greater in the probabilistic model, whereas
the converse is true for some other p, for instance p = 0.9.
Recall that if the initial network is minimal, the marginal payoﬀ of a link is always as great
in the probabilistic model as in the decay model. This diﬀerence in the result can be explained
as follows.
Suppose that the initial network, denoted by g1, is not minimal. Then, there exist at least
two players in g1, say i and j, such that there are at least two paths between these two players.
Let player i form a link with player j in g1 and denote by g2 the resulting network. Although
17the total payoﬀ of player i in g2 is greater in the probabilistic model than in the decay model,
this does not imply that the marginal payoﬀ of the link i j is greater in the probabilistic model
than in the decay model. Indeed, it is easy to check that, in g1, player i also gets a greater
payoﬀ in the probabilistic model than in the decay model.
When the initial network is not minimal, the diﬀerence in the marginal payoﬀ of a link i j
depends on the architecture of the initial network (in particular the number of paths that exist
between player i and the other players from whom i obtains resources) and on the probability
that a link works. This makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a general rule which orders the marginal
payoﬀ of a link in both models. Thus, when the number of players is greater than 3 and the
initial network is not minimal, information about strict Nash networks in one type of models
does not provide any indication about strict Nash networks in the other type of models.
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